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Marina Delmondes de Carvalho Rossi, PhD
University of Braśılia
Abstract
A well-known result is that infrastructure stock leads to higher productivity of
production factors such as capital and labor. This means that the marginal cost of
those factors may increase after a raise in infrastructure investment. However, it is
also known that infrastructure investment induces lower marginal costs to the trans-
portation sector. We propose a two-firm model with transportation as an mandatory
and intermediary good bought by the producer of consumer goods. We modify the
depreciation function of private transportation capital stock so that it varies inversely
with the infrastructure stock. This makes the capital stock higher and, thus, lowers its
marginal productivity and marginal cost. As a consequence, the transportation firm
has a reduction in its capital expenditures and this allows it to set lower freight rates.
Our numeric simulation shows that our specification lowers the optimum investment
rate of the economy when compared to the benchmark model used in the literature.
Moreover, our results shows that if the Brazilian government invests just about 2% of
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1 Introduction
Year after year, Brazilians strive to overcome the difficulties imposed by the poor transporta-
tion infrastructure that haunts the country. During every rain season, the news channels
notice queues of trucks jammed into the mud on unpaved roads. What if we improved the
quality of roads in Brazil? It is clear that this would benefit Brazilian economy and it is
not hard to find any study that emphasize the relation between infrastructure investment,
freight rates and production (BANISTER and BERECHMAN, 2000; BANERJEE, DUFLO
and QIAN, 2012). A more subtle and interesting aspect is understanding the transmission
channels through which transportation infrastructure impacts economic activity.
We develop a two-firm model assuming the infrastructure stock as reducing the depre-
ciation rate of private capital. As the stock of infrastructure increases, the stock of private
capital depreciates less and, therefore, its marginal productivity and marginal cost decreases.
We can show that part of the effect that links infrastructure investment, freight rates, and
economic product is the reduction of transportation firms’ expenditures. In essence, we are
adding one more transmission mechanism through which infrastructure affects the economy,
namely, the “cost reduction effect”, This effect plays along with the “production effect”, which
is normally presented by the literature by adding infrastructure stock into the production
function. In practice, this mean that the freight truck does not spend as much time in the
garage as before because it travels on a less damage highway. Therefore, this truck requires
less maintenance cost, has greater availability, and does not be to be replaced as often.
The literature on public goods argues that infrastructure stock increases the productivity
of production factors. Consequently, most papers adds the infrastructure stock directly
into the representative firm’s production function. If we assume that firm is a carrier, this
approach does have some practical correspondence, since the quality of infrastructure affects
the transit time of transportation (and the number of trips) and, thus, productivity. However,
in such papers, the price of some production factors increase as a consequence of this higher
marginal productivity, specially the cost of the private capital unit. As we know, the cost of
production factors marginally equals the marginal productivity of these components. This
means that there is an increase in the expenditures of the transportation firm, which is not
in line with empirical findings (for example, Banister and Berechman (2003) argue that as
much the quality of infrastructure improves, the production expenditure reduces).
By adding a transportation firm as an intermediary service brought by the firm that
produces the consumer good, we can see that our consumer goods firm reacts likewise the
firms in current literature - not drive by the production effect, but rather because freight rate
is lower and that means a production expenditure decrease.
We do a numerical simulation using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
framework. The shock is an unexpected raise in infrastructure investment. We use a
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parametrization that intents to replicate the Brazilian economy. We also consider alternative
parametrization scenarios as a robustness exercise. The comparative statics results show that
the best infrastructure investment rate to Brazil is about 5% of GDP, since it optimizes the
welfare. That rate is far low from others in literature, like Rioja (1999) that sets this rate
about 10%. This happens because we have another mechanism, the “cost reduction effect”,
that boost the benefits of infrastructure stock even after the “production effect” diminishes.
Even if the Brazilian government choose not be that benevolent, Brazilian production could
raise by 27.10% if the government invest permanently 1.96% of GDP, the rate that Frischtak
(2017) calculated that modernizes the Brazilian transport infrastructure stock up to 2060.
We also simulate the impact of price control policies, such as the one made by Brazilian
government after 2017’s truck drivers strike. We fixed the price to 5%, 10% and 15%-up
the steady state and the results show a decrease of 4.96% to 14.60% of production. Because
the models we usually find in the literature have just one representative firm (it does not
distinguish between carrier and goods producer), such simulations could not be done before.
2 Literature review and discussion
The literature of neoclassic growth models with public goods started with Aschauer (1989),
as the author decomposes the US Government investment in infrastructure between 1949
and 1985. He assumed a logarithmized Cobb-Douglas function and finds positive effects
of transport, energy and sanitation infrastructure stock in US economic growth. Ascheuer
(1989) was the first to empirically state the benefits of infrastructure investments.
Aschauer’s work inspired Barro (1991) to developed a theoretical neoclassic model with
infrastructure effects. In his work, he assumes one representative consumer and one rep-
resentative firm with a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns. Besides
the private capital and labor supply, the representative firm also uses a third element in the
production function, a public investment of infrastructure. Barro (1991) model was lately
improved by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) as they included the stock of infrastructure and
congestion adjustments.
After Barro (1991) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), several papers use this improved
model structure to study specific aspects of transport infrastructure and growth. That means
the basic model logic is the same to all these papers, but with some features extended: multi-
ple firms (RIOJA, 2004); heterogeneous consumers (GIBSON and RIOJA, 2017a); choice of
maintaining or expanding infrastructure stock (GIBSON and RIOJA, 2017b); time to build
new infrastructure and the consequential delay of commute time (GALLEN and WINSTON,
2018); and public goods rivalry (RIOJA, 2005) are good examples of such new features ag-
gregated.
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Neoclassical growth models with infrastructure displays peculiar effects regards to others
neoclassical growth models with public goods. This happens because infrastructure stock is
not in the utility function of the representative consumer, nor it is a component of the con-
sumer’s budget constraint (GALLEN and WINSTON, 2018). Actually, its effect is indirect
and ambiguous: just as the infrastructure stock increases the marginal productivity of inputs
(ASCHAUER, 1989; BARRO, 1990; RIOJA, 1999; and others), effect called “resource bene-
fit”, it also induces sub-optimum economic equilibrium as the increase in infrastructure stock
forces depends on a raise in the tax rate. Therefore, the equilibrium of these models usually
cannot be derived analytically and the marginal effect of infrastructure stock in product and
welfare generally shows a parabolic form.
A microeconomic consequence of higher productivity is higher cost of production factors
since it marginally equals its productivity. This means the cost of private capital, also known
as interest rates or marginal productivity of capital (MPK), would increase after an expansion
of infrastructure stock. We can clearly see that in the literature. Rioja (1999) shows that,
after an tax rate increase to finance an infrastructure investment, the economy shrinks; but
after this “fiscal effect”, the production, interest rates and private capital investments rapid
grow above the steady state.
Although this behavior fits well the effects of investment in several infrastructure sectors,
the idiosyncrasies of transport sector may induce others behaviors and results. Actually, we
think the aggregation of the literature may offset the idiosyncrasies of transport sector. For
example, on the one hand if roads are improved to permit faster trips, trucks drivers can
make more trips with the same capital stock and labor quantities as before – therefore, the
marginal productivity grows. We will call this the “production effect”. On the other hand,
their trucks may brake less and spend less time in garage because infrastructure is better and
with less potholes. As consequence, the vehicle is more available and the maintenance costs
are lower. Thus, the cost of production factors may reduce as the transport infrastructure
improves because the marginal productivity of the capital stock is lower than before. It is
like we would not be so interested to buy a new truck to our imaginary transport company
because the trucks we already have are getting the job done, since they break less.
The link between transport investment and operation cost reduction is not new to the
literature. As cited in Banister and Berechman (2000, p. 7), “The debate over the links
between transport infrastructure investment and economic development is not new. Ever
since roads and railways were built, one of the main arguments has been the impact that the
infrastructure would have on production costs.” In Lakashimanan (2011), the author comment
that the microeconomic analysis emphasizes the cost savings from transport improvements
as one way of how transport infrastructure impacts the economy. Cohen and Paul (2004)
analyze the impact of infrastructure investment with spatialized data using a cost-saving
function model. Other works cite such cost-reducing effect as well (MOUROUGANE and
PISU, 2011; KIM, HEWINGS and AMIR, 2016; TATANO and TSUCHIYA, 2007; CRAFTS,
2009; KLINGTHONG, 2017; among others).
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Most operational expenditures are mostly linked to costs of capital as you may have
notice from our previous examples. Whence, our approach to model the cost reduction
behavior relies on new specification of private capital depreciation function to carrier, general
equilibrium effects and the fact that we separated the transport firm from the consumer goods
firm, so we can better understand the effects.
If the truck breaks less, the depreciation of this stocked capital is lower than before1. So
transport infrastructure improvements may reduce the depreciation of private capital. But if
the private capital depreciates less, transport firms will need a smaller amount of investment
to keep the capital stock up. Another way to see it is realize that truck will have greater
availability, so the private capital stock will be higher than before. Because the private
stock increases (depreciates less), the production grows and the freight decreases. That is
what we call “cost reduction effect”. As we will show, the freight also decreases because the
diminishing cost of capital, so the shipping company production expenses also shrinks.
We resume these general equilibrium effects in Figure 1. There, the link between “In-
frastructure stock” and “Production of transport” is what we call production effect and the
links between “Carrier private capital depreciation”, “Marginal product of factors” and “Pro-
duction of transport” are the transmission mechanism that we propose (the cost reduction
effect). Note that our proposed model does have the “production effect” and the “cost
reduction effect”, but both appear just in transportation firm.
Figure 1: General equilibrium effects of our model.
Those are the effects in the shipping company. However, due to general equilibrium, the
consumer goods firm also benefits from freight reduction. Because this firm is obligate to
buy units of transport at the same amount of produced goods, its production expenditures
decreases and the production raises.
1We can think depreciation as maintenance of vehicles and edification as well.
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We are not the first ones to think about depreciation as a mechanism of transmitting
infrastructure benefits. In Gibson and Rioja (2017b), they make the private capital depre-
ciation, the efficiency of infrastructure and the public maintenance of infrastructure spend
as functions of infrastructure maintenance-GDP ratio, a parameter, so their could study the
implications of the allocation of public money on new infrastructure (raise in the stock) or in
infrastructure maintenance. We differ from them because our depreciation functions depends
directly on infrastructure stock and we do not parametrize this. As result, our depreciation
is given endogenously and, therefore, reacts to unpredicted shocks and variables movements.
We also use a two-firms model and our endogenously depreciation affects only one of these
firms.
Finally, the use of depreciation shock in RBC models already exists, although it is not
very common and may be never used to analyze infrastructure impact (at least, the we
could not find any paper related). Albonico, Kalyvitis and Pappa (2013) developed a DSGE
model with endogenously depreciation rate influenced by capital maintenance. The authors
find that depreciation rate is procyclical and very volatile, in contrast as the usual business
cycle literature adopts. Deli (2016) studies the impact of capital maintenance on endogenous
depreciation rate and suggest that it reduces the Solow residuals usually assumed by standard
RBC models.
In the next chapter, we explain the model we use and how we try to replicate the theo-
retical effects that we explained before. If the reader got interested by the good and worth
reading papers we briefly cited, we have provided in the Annex I a more comprehensive
discussion of the current literature.
3 Model specification
We describe our alternative model below in four blocks: consumers, industry, carrier and
government (see Figure 2). The consumer buy products from industry (QI) and offers capital
and labor to the carrier firm (KC , LC) and to the industry firm (KI , LI). The carrier sells
transport services to industry (pQC) and both firms pay taxes (λ). Finally, the government
invests in infrastructure (G)
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Figure 2: Schematic map of our model.
3.1 Consumers
Consumer utility function is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), a very common















1− LCt − LIt
)1−µ)1−η
(1)
where the subscript t is the time index; β is the intertemporal discount rate; CIt is the consume
of goods; KCt is the private capital associated with carrier sector; K
I
t is the private capital
associated with industry sector; LCt is the labor supply to carrier; L
I
t is the labor supply
to industry sector; and µ, η are CRRA parameters. We will use the superscript “I” to all
industry related variables and “C” to all carrier related variables.
The consumers are free to choose which firm they want to work and which one they want
to invest, but they must buy just consumer goods - that means they do not consume transport
services. These are their spending. For their labor, they receive wages; and for their capital,
























where I It is the investment of private capital in industry sector; I
C
t is the the investment of
private capital in carrier sector; rCt is the interest rate/marginal production of private capital
in carrier sector; rIt is the interest rate/marginal production of private capital in industry
sector; WCt is the wage/marginal product of labor in carrier sector; W
I
t is the wage/marginal
product of labor in industry sector.
The law of motion of carrier firm private capital is a bit different than traditional use.











where δ is the private capital depreciation and Gt is the transport infrastructure stock. So
the law of motion of transport sector private capital is:
ICt ≡ KCt −KCt−1 (1− δ?) (4)
Because transport infrastructure is subject to congestion with usage, we must adjust
the actual infrastructure stock using the carrier private capital. The ψ is the congestion
parameter. This formulation is the inverse of the term used in Rioja (1999).
Although not sophisticated, our depreciation function (δ?) have the desired property
of transmitting the changes in infrastructure stock: if the infrastructure stock grows at




diminishes and, as consequence, the
carrier private capital depreciation also decreases. With this function, we establish our new
transmission mechanism of effects derived from infrastructure stock.
The law of motion for consumer goods follows:
I It ≡ KIt −KIt−1 (1− δ) (5)
3.2 Firms
In our economy, there are innumerous consumers and two sectors of firms: one that only
produces transport services (carrier) and other that only produces homogeneous consumer
goods (industry). Because the industry needs to deliver the products to buyers, it must buy,
at a freight value pt, transport services from the carrier. To make it simple, we suppose the
consumer goods as numeraire and every unit of consumer goods produced needs one unit of
transport service (QC = QI). Because this restriction, the pt ∈ (0, 1), whereas, if not, the

















where πIt is the profit of industry; λt is the tax rate levied by the government; K
Id
t is
the private capital demanded by the consumer goods sector, LIdt is the labor demanded by
industry and α is the coefficient of production elasticity. The read must see that we used the
term ptQ
I
t instead of ptQ
C
t in order to emphasize the equality of both quantities.
Again, the transport sector is a bit different from usual. Here, it is important to note that
our proposed transport firm does have the production effect and the cost reduction effect. As
we explained latter, the literature was not wrong to assume production effect, but since they
just have one firm, they could not separate the carrier and the industry as we do.
Last section where we said that better infrastructure means faster trips. So our carrier
production function must aggregates this “production effect”, as we name before. But shall







? We think this may over-
estimates the impact in production. Using a software of traffic modelling, we adjust the
production effect as the same gain in travel speed. We describe our methodology in the
parametrization section. To mirror these ideas, we use a “cycle effect inflator” (τ), so if the
infrastructure stock increases, the marginal productivity of labor and private capital slightly

























where πCt is the profit of transport firm; λt is the tax rate levied by the government; K
Cd
t is
the private capital demanded by the transport sector, LCdt is the labor demanded by carrier





is the inverse of the one we used in the depreciation of carrier’s private
capital. It is inversed because more infrastructure stock improves production.
3.2.1 First order
We do not intent to describe all first order derivations (we left in the Annex II as well).
However, it is easy to see how the raise in tax rate reduces the productivity (or the cost of)
private capital and labor if we analyze the first order of firms problem:
rIt = (1− λt − pt)QIKIt (10)
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W It = (1− λt − pt)QILIt (11)
rCt = pt (1− λt)QCKCt (12)









are the derivations of the production function related to the re-
source in subscript. If the tax increases, the term (1 − λt) decreases and so the marginal
productivity of the factor.
3.3 Government
We assume a passive government that levies the tax on firms and instantaneously converts
into infrastructure stock. To be fair, this is a heritage from Barro (1991). Nonetheless,
this conversion is not one-by-one and suffers from govern inefficiencies. With inefficiencies,
infrastructure investment rate is very close, however different from tax rate.
The accumulation process of infrastructure stock is:







where Gt is the infrastructure stock; δ
g is the depreciation rate of infrastructure stock; and
ζ is the govern inefficiency rate.
Because tax rate is our shock variable, there is no optimization problem to set the best
tax rate to our economy. As in Rioja (1999), there is a autocorrelated process that drives




mean (1− φ) + φλt−1 (15)
where ελt is the exogenous shock; λ
mean is the mean tax rate. For example, when we do the
shock experiment, we set ελt = 1%, so λt increases in 1%.
3.4 Equilibrium Identities






















equations (16) and (17) have different period subscript because KIt is the capital stock
at the end of time t. So, in period t, firms rent the capital from the stock of the last end
of period, t − 1. Equations (18) and (19) are just the equalization of labor - all supplied
labor must equal the demanded labor. Equation (20) is our restriction of one consumer good
produced must be delivered by one unit of transport service. Finally, (21) is just the product
account.
4 Parametrization
This study do not aim to get empirical results, but an intent to replicate Brazilian param-
eters were made. Almost all of our parameters come from two studies. Rioja (1999) is
our benchmark paper and much of its parameters, such as consumer parametrization and
output-elasticities of firms, are equal or very close to newest papers. Also, if we use his
parametrization, we could better compare our models. We also use the work of Frischtak
(2017). His work is the most recent study that calculates depreciation rate and the stock of
Brazilian infrastructure. The sad conclusion of his results is that Brazil invested, on average,
0.67% of GDP between 2010 and 2016 and this was not enough to overcome the deprecation.
In 2018, the Inter-American Development Bank made a series of studies of efficiency
of public spending. With that work, we parametrize the ζ according to the inefficiency of
Brazilian government.
We used the software Highway Development and Management (HDM-4) calibrated ac-
cordingly the Brazilian National Department of Transport Infrastructure (DNIT) parameters
to estimate the average speed of trucks in one-lane roads at three qualities of pavement: ter-
rible, bad, regular, good and great. We choose one-lane because it is the most common kind
of road in Brazil. The average speed increases, on average, 4.56% across these pavement
qualities. So we assume that the production would increase in the same amount because the
time used in travels would decrease about this value.









This equation mimics the relation appointed by Rioja (1999) that Latin America infras-
tructure is congested about 20% and 30%, so the adjusted stock of infrastructure related to




equals 0.75 ∗Gt, therefore 75% of the “raw” stock.
Because we could not find any parametrization specifically to transport firms, we estimate
the capital output-elasticity of carrier using KLEM database of US transportation sector
(road, rail and water transportation). Our parametrization values are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Standard parametrization setting. Quarterly values.
Parameter Value Description Source
α 0.54 Industry private capital output-elasticity Rioja (1999)
β 0.9975 Intertemporal discount rate Rioja (1999)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of private capital Rioja (1999)
δg 0.0106 Depreciation rate of public infrastructure Frischtak (2017)
β 2.33 Utility curvature parameter Rioja (1999)
λmean 0.0067 Long-term tax rate Frischtak (2017)
µ 0.35 Consumption share Rioja (1999)
ω 0.1 Public infrastructure output-elasticity Rioja (1999)
φ 0.9 Persistence of lagged shock Rioja (1999)
ψ 0.091075 Congestion parameter *
σ 0.64 Carrier private capital output-elasticity Authors
τ 0.0456 Increased cycles coefficient Authors
ζ 0.039 Public investment inefficiency coefficient IADB (2018)
We also simulates many scenarios that are described in Table 2.
Is his study, Frischtak (2017) proposes a infrastructure investment target to Brazil, 1.96%
(2.92 times higher than the standard parametrization) of the product. The “Frischtak’s
setting” were test as a way to observe the [positive] distortions of this highest infrastructure
investment in Brazilian economy. However, Frischtak scenario is not a good way to analyze
marginal increases in the tax rate, so we also present a “1.01 times higher”, that is, 1%
increase in standard tax rate.
Moreover, we also test for higher depreciation scenarios (1% absolute raise in the private
depreciation rate we used and 1% absolute increase in the depreciation rate - that is 40%
higher), higher depreciation of infrastructure stock (from 0.0106 to 0.0107 - 1% increase -
and 0.0207 - 94% higher).
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Table 2: Alternative scenarios
Scenario Changes
Standard No changes
Higher capital depreciation rate (HCD) δ = 0.02525
Higher infrastructure depreciation rate (HID) δg = 0.0107
Frischtak λmean = 0.0196
+1% Tax rate λmean = 0.006767
HCD +1% absolute increase δ = 0.035
HID +1% absolute increase δg = 0.0206
5 Results
We have been arguing that there are another transition mechanism of infrastructure bene-
fits, the cost reduction effect, that plays along with the production effect. We expect that
you are convinced by our theoretical arguments, but now we want you to be convinced by
numerical results. To do so, we do two exercises: first, a comparative statics; second, a shock
experiment. The first intents to describe the long run effects of a persistent raise in the tax
rate and transport infrastructure investment by the government. The second is important
to explain how the variables react to an unexpected raise in the tax rate (and, thus, in the
investment rate).
5.1 Comparative statics
The comparative statics results are shown below and are presented as deviations from stan-
dard scenario. We add three more variables, EXPCt , EXP
I
t and Production effect, that
represent, respectively, the carrier production expenditures; the industry production expen-









. The cost reduction effect is represented by
δ?.
Table 3: Comparative statics results. Selected variables (complete table at Annex III)
Variable +1% Tax rate Frischtak HID HCD HID+1% HCD+1%
p -0,54% -40,42% 0,55% 0,67% 48,99% 27,79%
rCt -1,18% -64,70% 1,21% 2,09% 169,65% 118,91%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,91% 0,00% 36,36%
Gt 1,41% 271,81% -1,41% -1,51% -18,55% -34,35%
U 0,30% 18,09% -0,32% -0,92% -45,34% -48,62%
Y 0,41% 27.10% -0.43% -1.51% -48,79% -51,24%
Let us recall Figure 2. We raise the tax rate in 1% permanently and, as expected, the new
15
infrastructure stock is higher than before. The depreciation of carrier capital decreases and,
as consequence of lower depreciation of capital, the stock of carrier private capital increase. It
is interesting to see the variation of carrier private capital stock is higher than the industry’s
because of that.
It is also interesting that the carrier investment drops compared to standard setting,
because now, since the capital depreciates less, is not necessary to invest the same amount
as before – recall our argument in Section 2. This is clear if you see that the difference
between the variations of the depreciation of carrier capital (-1.30%) and its stock (+1.19%)
is almost the same as the variation of carrier investment (-0.12%). Because capital is cheaper
to carrier, it also substitute some labor factor by private capital.
The changes in the resource allocation of the carriers makes its production expenses unal-
tered and, actually, the profit raises because the decrease in prices are lower than the growth
of production, tax rate and transport cycles. It can’t be said about industry production
expenses, that raise compared to the standard setting. Since the industry has no profit
(it equals zero), the increase in production expenses follows the increase of production and
tax. Consequently, the increase in the production induce higher labor and capital usage and,
therefore, higher welfare.
By one side, our experiment with Frischtak investment rate suggestion also presents the
same movements, but in large scale. By the other side, the results of HID show opposite but
very similar to the +1% tax rate. This result is intuitive, since the infrastructure stock varia-
tion is almost the same as in tax rate increase and it affects the same structures (production
and carrier capital depreciation). HID with +1% absolute increase show the same pattern,
but magnified.
Finally, the HCD is the “worst” scenario in terms of product and welfare. This happens
because it’s the only scenario that prejudices both firms at the same time. Both firms
must pay more to use capital factor and, to the carrier, the variation is higher because
the infrastructure stock declines, consequence of lower collection of taxes, so it loses both
production and cost reduction effect. Again, HCD with +1% absolute increase also shows
the same movements, in a large scale, and the production decrease is still higher than the
HID with +1% absolute increase.
But how much of this results are induced by the cost reduction effect? To answer this, we
made a “benchmark model” with just production effects. This means equation (4) has the
same design as equation (5). On the one hand, if the infrastructure investment grows, cost
reduction effect induces higher product and lower freight, so the “benchmark model” product
increases less and the freight reduces less. On the other hand, the benchmark model shows
greater production in higher depreciation scenarios because it depends less of infrastructure
stock.
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Table 4 show a comparison of the steady states on both models to selected scenarios. We
can see that, for example, the product in the “+1% Tax rate” scenario is 0.63% higher in
cost reduction model than in benchmark model.
Table 4: Variation of cost reduction model results in relation to the benchmark model re-
sults.Selected variables (complete table at Annex III)
Variable +1% Tax rate Frischtak HID HCD
p -0,53% -40,08% 0,54% 0,52%
rCt -1,18% -64,70% 1,21% 1,17%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Gt 0,42% 29,81% -0,42% -0,41%
U 0,31% 19,50% -0,32% -0,31%
Y 0,42% 29,81% -0,42% -0,41%
Now, let compare the results with the literature. As said before, we were inspired by
Rioja (1999) and his work is the most comparable to ours. With “most comparable” we
mean that there are no structures that difference his work from ours beyond the two-firm
economy, fright prices, depreciation function and that he uses a tax rate of 6.24%.
According to Rioja (1999) simulations, +1% absolute increase in the tax rate (from 6.24%
to 7.24%) increase the product in 2.53%. If we increase our tax rate in +1% (from 0.67%
to 1.67%), the product raises about 24% 3. Why our model show such a high increase? The
main factor here is that our standard tax rate is far below the one used in Rioja (1999) and
the both models shows marginal decrease of benefits of infrastructure. If more infrastructure
means less marginal benefits, so Rioja’s model presents less benefits since it has higher tax
rate.
One may recall this marginal decreasing benefit is due to the raise of tax that is onerous
to the economy. That means a very tax rate can make the economy worse, since the effects
of higher infrastructure stock does not offsets the bad effects of tax levied. So both model,
ours or Rioja’s, present a parabolic curve of marginal gain in welfare (and production) relate
to the tax rate. The interesting fact here is that, in our model, the peak of this parabola
occurs with a tax rate of about 5% and in Rioja’s this peak happens when the tax rate is
around 10%.
What does it tell us? When we add the “cost reduction effect”, we need less investment in
infrastructure to achieve the optimum investment rate because there is another transmission
of benefit. In practice, the “overimprovement” of some road would be undesirable since the
cost reduction and the average speed of trips are so marginally low that does not compen-
3We did not showed this result in the tables before because it is very close to the Frischtak scenario’s
results
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sate the raise of tax. These are good news to Latin America and others underdevelopment
countries.
5.2 Short-term effects of the tax increase
In the comparative statics we assume a persistent shock in tax rate so that we could analyze
the long run effects of higher infrastructure capital. Our model produces a complex move-
ment, as there is the carrier service price that drives the effects to industry firm. All figures
with the movements we are going to describe are listed in Annex IV.
Let us start with the impact of tax shock (and, raise of infrastructure investment). First,
it drop the factor payments (wages and interest) to both firms and also the production of
industry and, thus, the transport production. By the carrier side, it sees two effects of cost
reduction that reduces its production expenses: first, the drop in cost of production factors,
as said before; second, since infrastructure stock increases, the fall in its private capital
depreciation rate that affects the cost of capital.
Now, the carrier must set the transport price. Remember that industry has zero profit, so
all its expenses (rIKI+wILI+pQI) must equal all they liquid revenue ((1− λ)QrI). If some
cost of production factor (rI , wI or p) raises, so it must adjust the use of inputs through the
new level of production. For example, if rI increases, KrI decreases and others production
factors (as LrI) may decrease as well, so that liquid revenue and production expenses equalize
again. Likewise, If the freight (p) grows, the industry will be forced to give up some capital
stock and labor and, as consequence, production and transport demand:
(1− λ)QI < rIKI + wILI+ ↑ pQI → (1− λ) ↓ QI = rI ↓ KI + wI ↓ LI+ ↑ p ↓ QI
Carrier, however, does not want a lower industry production, because it will mean a lower
transport demand. It has a alternative: it can give up some profit (since carrier has positive
profit) and reduce freight. And that is what happens. Such movements show how transport
input differs from a usual factors: it does not contributes to production (is not explicitly
in Qnt), but it use is obligatory. So, if freight increases, the only way to react is giving up
production. The firm does not have substitution effect to this kind of shock.
Carrier investment show an interesting movement. It raises after the tax shock. Actually,
we understand that as a result of the drop in cost of capital (-1.91%) higher than the wages
(-0.82%). Because the capital is more value than labor to the carrier, since output-elasticity
is higher to capital, it substitute labor (-1.09%) by capital stock (0.53%). The difference
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between the variations are due the loss of production. Of course, it decreases as the lower
depreciation makes capital stock more “available”.
Future is bright to industry. The freight prices continue to drop as the carrier capital
depreciation forces down the cost of capital. Although wages and interest rates of industry
increase after the tax shock (kind of “resource benefit” applies here), the industry expenses
do not, so production has room to expand. And, as production (of both firms) expand, the
government collects more taxes and the infrastructure raises – and the “wheel of fortune”
spins again.
There is no much to compare our model with Rioja (1999), since the last does not have
two firms or freight prices. However, one can see that the industry movements are very close
to the firm that Rioja assumes. That mean our industry does benefits from infrastructure
such as in Rioja (1999), however in diferent ways.
5.3 Price control policy simulation
After a serial of political scandals, the giant state-owner Petrobras oil company was almost
complete dismantled. As a reaction, the board of the company approved a bunch of reforms in
October 2016 such as periodic review of fuel prices in the light of changes in the international
oil market, exchange rates and others relevant factors. As investors view the new price
setting as a way to rebuilt the company finances, the truck drivers would not have the same
enthusiasm. Many factors drive the exchange rate to appreciate (in US dollars terms) in
early 2018 and, as consequence to the new Petrobras price setting, the diesel price rose in
local currency. As the self-employed truck drivers saw the cost shock, they claimed an action
by the government.
After a few days without any answer, the drivers started a huge strike that literally
stopped the country. Even the transportation firms could not operate, since the strikers
blocked and threatened any trucker who dare to work. As the strikes took several days,
jets barely could be refueled in some of the main airports, the poultry production suffered
extensive lost as the birds could not be feed, supermarkets lacked of food and many gas
stations, as they fuel stocks were not restored, rose the fuel prices. After all, the impacts
were estimated in billions of dollars to Brazilian economy. After days of intense strike, the
government finally answered the trucker’s claimed and, among other benefits, forced down
the diesel price and introduced a minimum shipping price table.
Is expected that the impacts of transportation minimum price could be tested in DSGE
models with infrastructure. However, as the literature usually presents these models, the
use of fixed prices cannot be tested since there are not a specialized transportation firm or
transportation price transmission. Alternative specifications, as ours presented here, enables
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such tests.
Therefore, the model was rerun, but modified with fixed prices for transportation service.
However, since the model would present more equations than variables, we drop the quantity















If we apply the same calibrated parameters in that “modified” model, the same results of
“original” model will be produced. So, we are clear to go on. The price was fixed to 5%, 10%
and 15% bigger than standard steady state as shown before. The Table 5 shows the results
as deviations from the long-run values with free transportation prices structure.
Table 5: Results from price control policy simulation (complete table at Annex III).
Variable +5% above SS +10% above SS +15% above SS
rCt 3,98% 8,29% 12,96%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Gt -4,96% -9,82% -14,60%
U 1,40% 2,93% 4,61%
Y -4,96% -9,82% -14,60%
The results are intuitively. The product drops almost the same rate of freight increase.
Because the cost of transport is higher, the industry must drop its production. As reaction,
the carrier firm also decreases its production as well. However, since the firms are not using
as much inputs as before, the consumers rent fall. It is interesting to note that infrastructure
stock also drops, so the depreciation of carrier private capital increases and the cost of capital
to the carrier react the same way. The final result, as expected, is lower welfare to consumers
and a very higher profit to carrier firms.
6 Conclusion
Current literature normally assumes the effect of a raise in infrastructure stock just in the
production function of a representative firm, generating what we called “production effects”.
However, this makes the production expenditures to raise with higher infrastructure stock.
If we assume a consumer goods firm, this result may makes sense (as we showed), but if we
analyse a transport firm, the result does not have practical meaning. We think the problem
here is because use just one representative firm and that hides the effects in transport sector
and how they are transmited to consumer goods sector.
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We proposed a two-firm model that just the transport firm has depreciation as a function
of infrastructure stock along with modified production effect structure. This depreciation
structure is a new transmission effect mechanics that complements the production effect. The
very point of adding new transmission mechanics is to make sure that costs of production
factors to transport firm, specially private capital costs, does not grow up after a raise in
infrastructure stock. This fact correlates with the usual result that more infrastructure
investment drops transport costs.
Our Brazilian-parametrized model is populated by consumers, carrier firms and industry
firms that produce consumer goods and must buy transport services. The numeric simulations
show that a small raise in infrastructure investment, provided by a raise in tax rate, induces
several general equilibrium effects, as lower freight values and higher economic product.
Specially, the optimal investment rate that maximizes the welfare in our model is lower than
the findings of the literature, because our new transmission mechanics.
We also used our model to analyze the effects of freight value control policy implemented
by Brazilian government after the truck drivers’ strike in 2018. Our model points out that
consumers may lost welfare and the carriers firms and truck drivers raised their profits.
We think that improving the depreciation functional form, adding other sectors of in-
frastructure and including public debt emission to finance the infrastructure investment are
interesting ways to improve our work.
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Annex I - Extended literature review
Before we start to develop a new approach to modelling growth with infrastructure problems,
we must review the current literature. This annex aims to glance the most important papers
in economic growth guided by stock of infrastructure, mainly DSGE modelling. Although
this work focus in transport infrastructure and as this specific topic is not well covered by
literature, a more broadly meaning of the term “infrastructure” will be used: the term will
denote not just refer to transportation infrastructure, but also energy, sanitation, telecom-
munication and so on.
The economic benefits related to maintaining a infrastructure stock is relatively new since
the main seminal paper was Aschauer (1989). In his empirical study, the author decomposes
the US Government investment in infrastructure between 1949 and 1985. Assuming a loga-
rithmized Cobb-Douglas’ production function, the author finds positive effects of transport,
energy and sanitation infrastructures stocks in US economic growth. Moreover, Aschauer
attributes the decrease of American productivity between 1971-1985 to the reduction in
non-military infrastructure stock (which englobes transport, energy and sanitation infras-
tructure).
Accordingly to Machicado (2007), empirical studies normally regress steady state equa-
tions or “growth accounting” identities. Doing that, its shows the importance of infras-
tructure in aggregate production, but can’t capture the feedbacks effects that infrastructure
generates in the economy. In order to do so, economic equilibrium models are preferable.
Inspired by Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990) developed the benchmark neoclassic model
and, by that, writes the seminal paper of theoretical infrastructure economic modelling. In
his work, he assumes one representative consumer and one representative firm with a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns. Besides the private capital and labor
supply, the representative firm also uses a third element in the production function, a public
investment of infrastructure that could be represented by the follow term:
f(G,K,L) = GψKαL(1− α)
where “G” is the public infrastructure provided; “K” is the private capital; and “L” is the
labor supply. In such fashion, it is possible a decrease in the marginal production of private
capital if the public infrastructure does not follow de increase in that input. Consequently,
public inputs will not be a perfect substitute of private inputs (capital) – an example would
be the public services that could not be charged efficiently if were provided by private agents.
In addition to the assumption of a third variable in the Cobb-Douglas production function,
Barro also assumes that public services are funding by a revenue tax. The government is
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responsible to setting the rate and levying taxes. Since it is assumed that the government
uses all the levying taxes contemporaneously (i.e., there is no government bound), there is
no discussion of the best temporal use of government bounds.
The Barro’s model was lately improved by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), in a study
that included the stock of infrastructure and congestion – so far, it was used just the flow
of infrastructure. Posterior works in economic equilibrium with infrastructure normally use
these both studies as base model, but modify the returns of the production function (1)
to be constant returns in private inputs (i.e., 0 < α < 1) and decreasing returns in public
infrastructure (i.e., 0 < ψ < 1). With this setting, one can observe that the aggregate
production function, f(G,K,L) shows a increasing returns of scale.
It is important to highlight that neoclassical growth models with infrastructure displays
peculiar effects regards to others neoclassical growth models with government spending. This
happens because infrastructure stock is not in the utility function of the representative con-
sumer, nor it is a component of the consumer’s budget constraint (GALLEN and WINSTON,
2018). Actually, its effect is indirect and ambiguous: just as the infrastructure stock increases
the productivity of marginal inputs ASCHAUER, 1989; BARRO, 1990; RIOJA, 1999; and
others), effect normally called “resource benefit”, it also induces sub-optimum economic equi-
librium as the increase in infrastructure stock forces a raise in the tax rate. Therefore, the
equilibrium of these models usually cannot be derived analytically and the marginal effect of
infrastructure stock in product and wellfare generally shows a parabolic form.
As an extension of Barro’s and Glomm and Ravikumar’s work, Rioja (1999) is credited
as one of the first empirical apply of DSGE models with infrastructure. In his paper, he
finds the optimal welfare occurs near 4% of aggregate production allocated for maintaining
infrastructure and a greater stock of infrastructure seems to have a positive effect in pri-
vate investment. Similar results are found at Rioja (2001). Using Rioja (2001) as a base
model and with data from five Latin-American countries, Machiado (2007) finds evidence
that the macroeconomics and welfare effects provided by infrastructure are usually related
with the infrastructure-aggregate production ratio. Also, the author advocate that, as the
crowding out effects are present in such modelling, minor quantities of public investment in
infrastructure (about 4% of aggregate production, as he comment) are preferable rather than
bigger allocations (about 10% of aggregate production, as he examples) as it allows private
investment.
Modifications on the quantity of agents were made in Rioja (2004), Gibson and Rioja
(2017a, 2017b). A very common hypothesis in economic equilibrium modelling with infras-
tructure is the existence of one representative firm, so that infrastructure effects all productive
sectors of the economy. In the first work, Rioja (2004) breaks this assumption when it models
three production firms, each one for agricultural sector; manufactures; and services. Infras-
tructure stock affects the production function of all three firms in the same manner, similar to
the benchmark model. The model is calibrated using Latin-American countries data for the
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1960s and 1990s, as the author wishes to compare de effects of infrastructure between these
periods. The results indicates that infrastructure investments in the 1960s had a greater
impact than in 1990s, due to the fact that these countries were less developed and, therefore,
needed more infrastructure stock. Moreover, in the 1960s, the manufacture sector were the
most benefited by infrastructure investments.
The second paper, Gibson and Rioja (2017a), also aimed to break a commonly assumption
that consumers are homogeneous, so that one can aggregate them in a single utility function
(representative consumer). In these models, a set of heterogeneous consumers were assumed
in order to allow the analysis of the effects of infrastructure in the social welfare. Gibson and
Rioja (2017a) modify the benchmark model as to create a theorical model that allows welfare
and social inequality effects analysis accordingly to the public infrastructure stock. The
results shows that increases in public infrastructure investment provokes a gradual and long-
term increase in welfare. In respect to inequality, the authors find that it depends on the level
of taxation: if the tax is levied on consume and labor, then the income inequality diminishes;
oppositely, if the tax is levied on the interest rates, the income inequality increases.
The third paper, Gibson and Rioja (2017b), focus in the effects of the trade-off between
maintaining an existing infrastructure or expand. In that study, the government aims two
objectives: maintain the quality of the infrastructure, which requires investment due to
the depreciation by usage; or expand the exist infrastructure. Both objectives impacts the
firms, since its affects the production function and the depreciation of the private capital.
A modified version of this setting will be used in this work lately. The results shows that
a policy focused on quality over expansion diminishes the income inequality, while a more
equilibrated policy between quality and expansion favors the aggregate production.
Gallen and Winston (2018) changes the dynamic transition of the economic model using
the time do build new infrastructure and the delay of commute time due these works. Con-
sequently, the transition of the effects are given by: increase in the productivity of private
firms’ input; the decrease of transit time for commuters to shop or work; the raise of taxes on
consumer spending. The authors find that public infrastructure investment have a positive
greater effect in aggregate production than in welfare, since the agents consume more and,
therefore, work more and spent more time in transit to go shopping. Another interesting
result is listed: the delays on the build infrastructures are actually efficient, since it allows
the private capital to adjust to the new infrastructure stock before the construction time
ends.
Economic models with public infrastructure also permits evaluate the best allocation of
public resources in a set of investment sectors that rivalry the government funding. As an
example, Rioja (2005), studies an economy with education and infrastructure sections that
rivalry the public resources. He argues that both investment are welfare-improvement, but
education investment have a slightly greater impact than infrastructure investment. However,
this substitution relation is beneficial to the economy until a threshold is reached.
26
Just a few papers bring alternatives formulations of the benchmark model on. Rovolis and
Spence (2002) specifies alternative ways to Aschauer’s work. As the authors argue, besides
the Aschauer’s results were discussed by many others studies after, “The production function
analysis dominance of the infrastructure debate, however, is not uncontested” (ROVOLIS and
SPENCE, 2002, page 57). So, the authors assume the same production function of Achauer’s,
but they analyze the dual problem, namely, the firms’ problem of cost minimization. By that
setting, the infrastructure investment reduces the cost of the firms (aggregately), since the
infrastructure investment increases the marginal production of the inputs. In addition, the
authors find a substitution relation between public infrastructure and intermediate inputs
and a complementary relation between public infrastructure and private capital.
The comment of Rovolis and Spence (2002) is relevant, because production inputs and
functional form o production function in neoclassical growth models with infrastructure are
not well debated. One may see two attention points that these models arise: the raise of
marginal cost of inputs and the concept of production function itself.
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Equilibrium relationships (after reduction)
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Annex III - Comparative statics complete tables
Table 6: Comparative statics results
Variable +1% Tax rate Frischtak HIC HDC HIC+1% HDC+1%
δ? -1,30% -71,18% 1,33% 2,30% 186,66% 130,83%
λ 1,00% 192,54% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
p -0,54% -40,42% 0,55% 0,67% 48,99% 27,79%
πCt 0,12% -6,07% -0,13% -1,14% -26,25% -37,40%
rCt -1,18% -64,70% 1,21% 2,09% 169,65% 118,91%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,91% 0,00% 36,36%
Production effect 0,01% 0,64% -0,01% -0,01% -38,41% -44,93%
CIt 0,62% 50,10% -0,66% -1,87% -38,41% -44,93%
EXPCt 0,00% -16,54% -0,02% -1,03% -0,48% -0,23%
EXP It 0,54% 40,09% -0,57% -1,68% -49,36% -51,91%
Gt 1,41% 271,81% -1,41% -1,51% -18,55% -34,35%
ICt -0,12% -31,87% 0,10% -0,83% -45,34% -48,62%
I It 0,83% 70,12% -0,86% -1,95% -68,31% -44,93%
KCt 1,19% 136,42% -1,22% -3,05% -13,42% -30,77%
KIt 0,83% 70,12% -0,86% -2,92% -59,82% -55,18%
LCt -0,61% -43,71% 0,62% 0,82% -69,80% -70,01%
LIt 0,22% 14,74% -0,22% -0,21% -59,82% -67,99%
QIt 0,55% 41,93% -0,57% -1,68% 59,05% 34,64%
QCt 0,55% 41,93% -0,57% -1,68% -21,53% -10,48%
U 0,30% 18,09% -0,32% -0,92% -45,34% -48,62%
WCt 0,61% 48,27% -0,64% -1,83% -45,34% -48,62%
W It 0,61% 48,27% -0,64% -1,83% 38,61% 42,30%
Y 0,41% 27.10% -0.43% -1.51% -48,79% -51,24%
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Table 7: Variation of cost reduction model results in relation to the benchmark model results.
Variable +1% Tax rate Frischtak HIC HDC
p -0,53% -40,08% 0,54% 0,52%
πCt 0,05% -11,71% -0,03% -0,05%
rCt -1,18% -64,70% 1,21% 1,17%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Production effect 0,00% 0,10% 0,00% 0,00%
CIt 0,64% 55,79% -0,65% -0,63%
EXPCt 0,02% -13,27% -0,02% -0,02%
EXP It 0,55% 44,75% -0,56% -0,54%
Gt 0,42% 29,81% -0,42% -0,41%
ICt -0,10% -29,21% 0,10% 0,09%
I It 0,84% 76,49% -0,86% -0,83%
KCt 1,21% 145,67% -1,22% -1,18%
KIt 0,84% 76,49% -0,86% -0,83%
LCt -0,61% -43,64% 0,62% 0,60%
LIt 0,21% 14,68% -0,22% -0,21%
QIt 0,55% 44,75% -0,56% -0,54%
QCt 0,55% 44,75% -0,56% -0,54%
U -0,31% -19,50% 0,32% 0,31%
WCt 0,63% 53,90% -0,64% -0,62%
W It 0,63% 53,90% -0,64% -0,62%
Y 0,42% 29,81% -0,42% -0,41%
Table 8: Results from price control policy experiment.
Variable +5% above SS +10% above SS +15% above SS
δ? 4,38% 9,12% 14,26%
λ 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
πCt 11260.02% 21004,66% 29332,31%
rCt 3,98% 8,29% 12,96%
rIt 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Production effect -0,02% -0,04% -0,06%
CIt -4,80% -9,54% -14,23%
EXPCt -5,82% -11,40% -16,76%
EXP It -6,17% -12,09% -17,78%
Gt -4,96% -9,82% -14,60%
ICt -5,46% -10,72% -15,80%
I It -8,71% -16,85% -24,46%
KCt -9,42% -18,18% -26,31%
KIt -8,71% -16,85% -24,46%
LCt -0,03% -0,01% 0,05%
LIt -3,10% -6,16% -9,20%
Qt -6,17% -12,09% -17,78%
U 1,40% 2,93% 4,61%
WCt -5,79% -11,39% -16,80%
W It -5,79% -11,39% -16,80%
Y -4,96% -9,82% -14,60%
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Annex IV - Shock simulation figures
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